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CAUTION! GOVERNMENT INTRUSION MAY BE 
CLOSER THAN IT APPEARS: THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT CONSIDERS GPS DEVICES UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMMENDMENT 
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Cite as: Catherine A. Stephens, Caution! Government Intrusion May Be Closer Than 
It Appears: The Seventh Circuit Considers GPS Devices Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 3 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 617 (2008), at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v3-2/stephens.pdf. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides protection for individuals from 
unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, property, and 
effects.1 However, as technology advances and the need for security in 
this country increases, individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights are in 
danger. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking devices can now 
be easily installed on anyone’s car. The GPS device can then track that 
person’s movement for an extended period of time through the use of 
sophisticated computer and satellite technology. Under the current 
state of the law, the police are able to place these GPS devices on 
cars or possessions without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a 
warrant.  
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. (Biopsychology and Cognitive Science, Sociology), University of 
Michigan–Ann Arbor, April 2002. Additionally, the author would like to thank Jill 
E. Bornstein for the title of this paper.  
1 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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This convergence of rapidly improving technology and Fourth 
Amendment rights has created a novel legal issue: If the police install 
a GPS device on an individual’s car or possession without first proving 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, or without first obtaining a 
warrant, does their action violate the Fourth Amendment?  
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court found that the police 
violate the Fourth Amendment when they infringe on an individual’s 
privacy in a place where that individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.2 However, a few years later in United States v. Knotts, the 
Supreme Court found that police monitoring of a beeper installed on 
an individual’s car did not constitute a search or seizure and therefore 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the individual did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy while traveling on a public 
road.3  
GPS technology is very new; therefore, few cases across the 
country have addressed the possible Fourth Amendment violation that 
installing the GPS device creates. The Supreme Court has yet to 
decide the issue of “whether installing [a GPS] device in [a] vehicle 
convert[s] the subsequent tracking into a search.”4 The circuits are 
split over the issue with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits holding that 
installing a GPS device does not constitute a search, and the First, 
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits holding the opposite.5 In the circuit split 
cases, it is important to note that these cases concern tracking devices 
in general, not just GPS devices. 
The Seventh Circuit recently addressed this issue in United States 
v. Garcia.6 In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Fifth and the 
Ninth Circuits’ finding that the evidence obtained by using the GPS 
                                                 
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
3 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
4 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007); See Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276 (where the Court found that monitoring a beeper, as opposed to 
installing a beeper, to track a vehicle did not constitute a search. The court did not 
decide the issue of whether installing the device constituted a search). 
5 See Garcia, 474 F.3d. at 997 (listing cases). 
6 Id.  
2
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device was not the fruit of an illegal search.7 Therefore, there was no 
Fourth Amendment violation.8 The Seventh Circuit put heavy weight 
on the fact that the police used the GPS device simply to make their 
job of tracking the suspect easier.9 Instead of assigning an officer to 
follow a suspect in a car—an activity that would not violate the Fourth 
Amendment—the court held that the police can install a GPS device to 
follow the suspect instead.10 However, in deciding Garcia, the Seventh 
Circuit made many errors in its reasoning. The court should have 
found that installing a GPS device constitutes a search; therefore, a 
warrant is required prior to installing the device. The Seventh Circuit 
should have protected the Fourth Amendment by requiring that the 
police obtain a warrant prior to commencing the search, that is, prior 
to installing the GPS device.  
Part 1 of this comment will provide a background on beeper and 
GPS technology; a discussion of searches and seizures within the 
Fourth Amendment; and an overview of the warrant requirement, and 
the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards. Part 2 will 
examine judicial precedent surrounding the issue, including four 
United States Supreme Court cases and circuit and state court cases. 
Part 3 will examine a recent Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. 
Garcia, where the court found that installing a GPS device without a 
valid warrant was not a search; therefore, there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation. Part 4 will explain why Garcia was wrongly 
decided and why a warrant should be required before the police can 
install a GPS device on an individual’s car or possession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
3
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I.  BACKGROUND  
 
A.  Beepers and GPS Technology 
 
GPS technology is a very recent technological advancement. The 
U.S. Air Force launched the twenty-fourth NAVSTAR satellite into 
orbit on June 26, 1993.11 Launching NAVSTAR was the last step in 
creating the Global Positioning System.12 GPS tracking is a much 
more technologically advanced tracking system than the beepers and 
radio transmitters used by the police prior to GPS to track suspects.13 
The GPS system consists of a network of at least twenty-four satellites 
that send radio signals transmitting their location.14 Then, GPS 
receivers on Earth “triangulate their own three-dimensional position 
using information from at least four of the satellites.”15 Triangulating 
means that the GPS “calculates the distance to each satellite by 
measuring the time necessary for a radio signal to travel to that 
satellite.”16  
The information gained from a GPS device is called a “fix” and 
includes the longitude, latitude, and time.17 Once the fix is recorded, it 
operates as a track or precise record of travel.18 The fix must then be 
downloaded because the actual device does not hold much 
information, and then the police can obtain a precise chronological 
                                                 
11 Kevin Keener, note, Personal Privacy in the Face of Government Use of 
GPS, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 473, 474 (2008) (citing National Parks 
Service, Global Positioning Systems: History, http://www.nps.gov/gis/gps/ 
history.html). 
12 Id. 
13 John S. Ganz, It’s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need 
Warrants To Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 95 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1325, 1328 (2005). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Keener, supra note 11, at 474. 
17 Ganz, supra note 13, at 1328. 
18 Id. 
4
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record of travel.19 Typically, GPS devices fit on the underside of a car, 
are the size of a book, and can be installed by using magnets.20 GPS 
allows the police to track suspects without having to do real-time 
visual surveillance and without taking up any individual police 
officer’s time.21 GPS devices can be tracked in real time as well as by 
using a computer and a map that displays where the device is currently 
located.22 The GPS device is capable of storing information for days, 
weeks, or even years.23  
Prior to GPS, police used beepers and radio transmitters to aid 
them in tracking a suspect.24 Police attached a beeper to a suspect’s car 
or possessions allowing the police to more effectively follow the 
suspect live.25 The beeper or radio transmitter “emits periodic signals 
that can be picked up by a radio receiver.”26 Then, the police can 
follow the suspect visually in the car and also follow the signal being 
emitted by the beeper.27 Beepers allow the police to follow a suspect 
by following the radio signals or to find a suspect if the police lose 
track during live visual surveillance. In comparison to today’s 
technology—namely GPS technology—beepers are considered 
unsophisticated.28  
Therefore, because of its amazing capabilities including its ability 
to keep a precise record of one’s travel for an unlimited amount of 
time, and the fact that the police do not need to actively follow the 
suspect in real time in their cars, the GPS device is radically different 
and much more technologically advanced than beeper technology. 
                                                 
19 Id. at 1329. 
20 Id. 
21 State v. Scott, 2006 WL 2640221, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 15, 
2006). 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Ganz, supra note 13, at 1328. 
25 Id. 
26 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
27 Id. 
28 United States v. Berry, 300 F.Supp.2d 366, 367-68 (D. Md. 2004). 
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Because GPS technology is so new, courts often look at cases 
involving beepers for guidance. However, strict dependence on beeper 
cases might not be wise considering the vast differences between the 
two technologies. 
 
B.  The Fourth Amendment 
 
GPS and beeper cases are typically examined under the Fourth 
Amendment.29 The Fourth Amendment states: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.30 
 
The Fourth Amendment serves a gate keeping function between 
free society and police actions.31 The Supreme Court has clearly stated 
that “[a] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”32 Prior to Katz v. United 
States, the government typically had to physically intrude for a search 
to occur.33 However, in Katz, the Court found physical intrusion was 
not necessary in order to perform a search.34 The Katz court found that 
the Fourth Amendment protected people, not just places.35 
                                                 
29 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Knotts, 460 U.S. 276; United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
30 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
31 Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up In Knotts? GPS Technology and the 
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L.REV. 409, 444 (2007). 
32 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
33 Hutchins, supra note 31, at 409; Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
34 Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353. 
35 Id. at 351. 
6
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In addition, a seizure “occurs when there is some meaningful 
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that 
property.”36 Further, the Court has stated that: 
 
The existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to 
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, 
however, for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to establish a constitutional violation.37  
 
C.  Warrant, Probable Cause, and Reasonable Suspicion 
 
There are three different standards that describe the level of proof 
that the police must have before commencing certain activities such as 
seeking a warrant, conducting a search of a person or property, or 
frisking an individual. The highest standard is a warrant, followed by 
probable cause, and then reasonable suspicion. 
The Supreme Court has created a presumption that the police 
must secure a warrant prior to conducting a search, absent exigent 
circumstances.38 In GPS cases, a central issue is whether the use of the 
GPS device constitutes a search. If it does, then absent exigent 
circumstances, it would follow that the police must secure a warrant 
prior to using the device.  
However, if a court finds that police use of a GPS device is not a 
search and therefore a warrant is not required, then the courts could 
find that police must show probable cause before the GPS device can 
be properly installed on a vehicle or possession. Proving probable 
cause imposes a higher burden than proving reasonable suspicion, but 
a lower burden than a obtaining a warrant.39 Police can prove probable 
cause when, looking at the totality of the circumstances, they can show 
                                                 
36 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. 
37 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984). 
38 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385, 390 (1978). 
39 United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155-C, 2006 WL 1294578, at *5 (W.D. 
Wis. May 10, 2006). 
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that a reasonably prudent person would believe that the search of a 
particular area will produce evidence of a crime.40 In proving probable 
cause, the officers must make common sense judgments and 
reasonable inferences, based on the totality of the circumstances and 
their training and experience, about what a search will uncover.41 As 
long as the officers can prove this, then they can prove probable cause 
exists.42 
The lowest threshold—below a warrant and probable cause—is 
reasonable suspicion.43 To prove reasonable suspicion, one must show 
some objective finding that someone is about to do something 
typically prohibited.44 Reasonable suspicion is similar to probable 
cause in that reasonable suspicion can be based on an officer’s 
common sense and inferences about how people typically act.45 The 
totality of the circumstances will determine if the officers had a 
reasonable belief that illegal activity was likely and that their intrusion 
was justified.46 Therefore, the officers’ experience and common sense, 
as well as inferences about the suspect, come into play.47  
 
II.  JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the installation of a 
tracking device constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.48 
However, the Supreme Court has held that the warrantless monitoring 
                                                 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at *6. 
42 Id. (quoting United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 763-64 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
43 Garcia, 2006 WL 1294578, at *3 (finding “[r]easonable suspicion is the 
lowest cognizable evidentiary threshold, one step above an inchoate and 
unparticularized hunch, but below probable cause and considerably lower than a 
preponderance of the evidence.”). 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007). 
8
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of a beeper or radio transmitter does not constitute a search.49 The 
Court first tackled the issue in Katz v. United States;50 it was further 
fleshed out in United States v. Knotts,51 United States v. Karo,52 and 
United States v. Kyllo.53 Subsequent to these cases, a split has 
developed among the circuit courts and state courts as to whether the 
installation of a tracking device constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. This section will focus on all of these cases which 
examine whether the warrantless installation and monitoring of a GPS 
device constitutes a search.  
 
A.  Supreme Court Cases: Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo 
 
1.  Katz v. United States 
 
In Katz, the Supreme Court found that a search or seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment occurs when one’s justified expectation of 
privacy is violated.54 In Katz, the defendant made gambling bets via a 
pay phone on a public street.55 The FBI then attached an electronic 
listening and recording device to that public phone booth.56  
The trial court and the appellate court found that recording the 
defendant’s calls did not violate the Fourth Amendment.57 The 
Supreme Court disagreed and stated that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”58 The Court stated that “what he seeks to 
                                                 
49 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983). 
50 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
51 Knotts, 460 U.S. 276. 
52 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
53 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
54 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
55 Id. at 348. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 351. 
9
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preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”59 The Court held that the presence of a 
physical intrusion is not necessary and that: 
 
The government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which 
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus 
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.60 
 
Therefore, the Court determined that the defendant’s belief that 
his conversation would be private was reasonable, and accordingly, the 
government’s actions infringed on his Fourth Amendment rights.61 
Searches conducted without probable cause or a warrant “are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”62  
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in Katz and laid out a 
two-part test for determining reasonable expectations of privacy.63 The 
first part of the test involves determining “that a person [has] exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”64 The second part of the 
test involves determining “that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.”65 This two-part test has been 
followed by countless courts and now represents the standard for a 
court to determine if an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Id. at 351. 
60 Id. at 353 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 357. 
63 Id. at 360-62. 
64 Id. at 361. 
65 Id.  
10
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2.  United States v. Knotts 
 
Unlike in Katz where the government attached a recording device 
to a public phone booth, United States v. Knotts dealt with the police 
using a beeper inside a canister for the purpose of electronically 
tracking the suspect.66 In Knotts, law enforcement officials believed 
that the defendant was involved in the manufacture of illegal drugs.67 
Therefore, they coordinated with the seller of a chloroform product the 
defendant was about to purchase and placed a radio transmitter beeper 
inside the container.68 Using the beeper, the police followed the 
defendant to a cabin in Wisconsin, obtained a warrant and searched the 
cabin, and discovered an amphetamine laboratory.69  
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 
based on the warrantless monitoring of the beeper.70 However, the 
appellate court reversed “finding that the monitoring of the beeper was 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because its use had violated 
respondent’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”71  
The Supreme Court, relying on Katz, noted that Fourth 
Amendment claims turn on whether the individual had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.72 The Court then noted that monitoring the 
beeper was akin to the police following the defendant in a car on a 
public street.73 The Court then cited multiple cases that state that when 
one is in an automobile, he has a diminished expectation of privacy.74 
Specifically, the Court quoted a case that stated: 
 
                                                 
66 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
67 Id. at 278. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 279. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 280 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
73 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
74 Id. at 281 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). 
11
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One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because 
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s 
residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little 
capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public 
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in 
plain view.75 
 
As noted, the Court placed a heavy emphasis on the idea that the 
information gathered by the police could have been gathered by 
simply following the defendant in his car.76 Police use of the beeper 
merely assisted the police in gathering information and did not 
indicate to the Court that the police could not have obtained the 
information without it.77 The Court stated that “[n]othing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory 
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as 
science and technology afforded them in this case.”78 Therefore, the 
Court held that “monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any 
legitimate expectation of privacy on the respondent’s part, and thus 
there was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of 
the Fourth Amendment.”79  
However, the author of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist, stated that 
if law enforcement begins using “dragnet type law enforcement 
practices,” perhaps then it will be time to consider whether a 
constitutional issue arises.80 The Court ultimately determined that in 
Knotts, the beeper merely served to make the police search more 
effective; therefore, there was no constitutional violation.81 
 
                                                 
75 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 
(1974)). 
76 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 276. 
80 Id. at 284. 
81 Id.  
12
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3.  Unites States v. Karo 
 
Shortly after Knotts, the Court again tackled whether beepers 
violated the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Karo. In Karo, the 
Court focused on the monitoring of a beeper that ended up inside of a 
house, where occupants typically have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.82  
In Karo, Drug Enforcement Administration agents suspected the 
defendant was manufacturing drugs.83 They obtained a court order to 
attach and monitor a beeper in a can of ether that the defendant was 
about to purchase.84 After a period of days during which the agents 
monitored the can of ether, including while the can was inside a 
private residence, the police arrested the defendant for conspiring to 
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute.85 The trial court granted 
the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence because the court 
found that the beeper installation and monitoring was unauthorized 
and invalid.86 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court, reasoning that 
a warrant was required prior to the beeper installation.87 The Tenth 
Circuit argued that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated when he obtained the can of ether.88 The Tenth Circuit stated: 
 
All individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy that 
objects coming into their rightful ownership do not have 
electronic devices attached to them, devices that would give law 
enforcement agents the opportunity to monitor the location of the 
objects at all times and in every place that the objects are taken.89 
 
                                                 
82 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
83 Id. at 708. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 709-10. 
86 Id. at 710. 
87 Id.  
88  Id. at 711-12. 
89 Id. at 712. 
13
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In Karo, Justice White stated that the Court needed to decide two 
issues left unresolved by Knotts: first, whether the installation of a 
beeper installed with the consent of the original owner before the 
ultimate buyer takes possession constitutes a search or seizure when 
the ultimate buyer has no knowledge of the beeper; and second, 
“whether monitoring of a beeper falls within the ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment when it reveals information that could not have been 
obtained through visual surveillance.”90 
First, the Court found that the installation of the beeper on the can 
of ether was not a search or seizure.91 The Court reasoned that at the 
time the beeper was placed on the can of ether, it was the property of 
the DEA.92 Second, the Court held that monitoring of the beeper did 
violate the defendant’s rights because the DEA agents monitored Karo 
by monitoring the beeper while it was inside a private residence.93 
Private residences are typically recognized as spaces where individuals 
have a right to expect privacy from government intrusion without a 
warrant.94  
To be clear, the difference between Knotts and Karo is that in 
Knotts, the information the police obtained could have been obtained 
by following the defendant on a public street.95 However, in Karo, the 
police could not have obtained the information without performing an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.96 They could not 
have visually obtained the information without entering the 
defendant’s home.97 Therefore, in Karo, the Court found that the 
                                                 
90 Id. at 707. 
91 Id. at 712-13. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 714. 
94 Id. at 714-15 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981)). 
95 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
14
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defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the monitoring 
of the beeper while inside a private residence.98 
 
4.  United States v. Kyllo 
 
Many years after Karo, the Supreme Court again dealt with a case 
involving government surveillance, although this time with a new, 
novel technology.99 In Kyllo, government agents suspected the 
defendant was growing marijuana in his home, an activity which 
required the use of high-intensity lamps.100 Therefore, government 
agents quickly scanned the defendant’s home with a thermal imager in 
the middle of the night from the street, unbeknownst to the 
defendant.101 This scanner helped the agents determine if the amount 
of heat radiating out of the defendant’s home was consistent with the 
use of the required high-intensity lamps.102 The scan revealed that the 
area over the garage and on one side of the defendant’s home were 
“relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially 
warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex.”103 
From the scan, the agents obtained a warrant, searched the 
defendant’s home, and discovered he was indeed growing 
marijuana.104 The trial court denied defendant’s petition to suppress 
the evidence resulting from the scan.105 The court of appeals found 
that the defendant made no attempt to hide the heat escaping from his 
home; therefore, he had no subjective expectation of privacy.106 Also, 
even if he had shown a subjective expectation, there was no objective 
                                                 
98 Id.  
99 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
100 Id. at 29. 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 30. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 31. 
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expectation of privacy, because the scan only revealed hot spots in the 
defendant’s home, not any intimate details of his life.107  
The Court found that: 
 
[T]he Government use[d] a device that is not in general public 
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.108  
 
Therefore, similar to Karo, because the police would not have 
been able to obtain the information without entering the defendant’s 
home, the Court found the scan to be a search.109  
 
B.  A Chronological Look at Circuit Court and State Court Cases 
Finding the Use of GPS Devices or Beepers Is a Search 
 
The Supreme Court has created a presumption that in order for 
police to legally conduct a search, they must obtain a warrant when 
doing so is feasible.110 However, a warrant is only required when there 
is an actual search under the Fourth Amendment.111 Therefore, the 
issue of whether the installation and monitoring of a beeper or GPS 
device constitutes a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is 
central to the issue of whether a warrant is required. In the cases that 
follow, the courts ruled that there was a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 40. 
109 Id.  
110 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). 
111 Id. 
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1.  United States v. Moore (First Circuit, 1977)—Beeper Case 
 
In Moore, the district court found that evidence obtained by using 
beepers to track movement violated the Fourth Amendment.112 DEA 
agents attached a beeper to a box carrying chemicals before the 
defendant possessed it.113 Another beeper was attached to the 
underside of the defendant’s vehicle.114 Relying on Katz, the First 
Circuit looked to whether the use of a beeper violated a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and commented that although one does not 
have an expectation of privacy when on public roads; one does not 
expect to be tracked while in public.115 The court concluded that a 
beeper “transforms the vehicle, unknown to its owner, into a 
messenger.”116 Therefore, “[w]hile a driver has no claim to be free 
from observation while driving in public, he properly can expect not to 
be carrying around an uninvited device that continuously signals his 
presence.”117 Recognizing these competing ideas, the First Circuit held 
that the state must show that it had probable cause before attaching a 
beeper. In Moore, the court found such probable cause so that the use 
of the beepers did not violate the Fourth Amendment.118 
 
2.  United States v. Shovea (Tenth Circuit, 1978)—Beeper Case 
 
In Shovea, federal agents suspected the defendant of being 
involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine, so they attached a 
                                                 
112 United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1977). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 112. 
116 Id.  
117 Id.  
118 Id. at 113. Compare with United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 
1980), where DEA agents attached a beeper into a can while it was in the DEA’s 
possession. Id. at 860. There, the court held that the defendant’s possessory interests 
were not interfered with because the installation did not take place while the can was 
in his possession. Id.   
17
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beeper to his car in order to track his movements.119 After days of 
observation and after accumulating evidence that their suspicion was 
correct, the agents arrested the defendant.120 The Tenth Circuit 
attempted to balance the fact that the installation of the beeper was a 
trespass with the fact that one may not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when traveling on public roads.121 Inexplicably deciding to 
ignore the trespass in its decision, the court found that it need not 
resolve this problem because the police had probable cause to attach 
the device.122 The court stated that: “[i]f there is probable cause, an 
automobile, because of its mobility, may be searched without a 
warrant in circumstances that would not justify a warrantless search of 
a house or office.”123 Therefore, because there was probable cause, 
there was no violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.124 
 
3.  United States v. Bailey (Sixth Circuit, 1980)—Beeper Case 
 
The Sixth Circuit determined that a beeper installed even after 
police obtained a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.125 In 
Bailey, DEA agents installed a beeper into a drum of chemicals that 
the defendant was about to purchase, obtained a warrant to enter the 
building the defendant was in, and arrested him for drug crimes.126 
The Sixth Circuit did not characterize the installation of the beeper as 
a search or a seizure.127 Rather the court focused on if the installation 
violated a legitimate expectation of privacy.128 The court noted that 
even de minimis intrusions are relevant to the Fourth Amendment if 
                                                 
119 United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978).  
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 1387. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1388. 
124 Id.  
125 United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 939 (6th Cir. 1980). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 940.  
128 Id.  
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they violate an expectation of privacy.129 The court disagreed with the 
government’s assertion that the intrusion was minor, stating that “the 
intrusion is minor only if it does not violate protected individual 
privacy.”130 
The court disregarded whether the beeper installation constituted 
a search because the police installed the beeper while the container 
was in the agents’ custody, and not the defendant’s.131 Therefore, the 
only issue to consider was whether the monitoring constituted a 
search, and the court concluded that it did.132 The court found under 
Katz, the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy because 
his actions of keeping the chemicals in private areas and out of public 
view demonstrated that he wanted to keep the location of the 
chemicals private.133 Additionally, the court found that “the law is 
prepared to recognize as legitimate an individual’s expectation of 
privacy with respect to what he does in private with personal property 
he has a right to possess.”134 
 
4.  State v. Jackson (Washington State, 2003)—GPS Case 
 
In Jackson, the defendant called the police to report his missing 
daughter.135 After a few days, police believed the defendant was 
involved in his daughter’s disappearance, so they obtained warrants to 
search his house and two cars and also installed GPS tracking devices 
on his cars.136  
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 943. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 943-44. 
134 Id. at 944; See also State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988) (where the 
court found that because the police failed to effectively follow the defendant in his 
car and therefore had to install a radio transmitter to track him, there was a search 
under the Oregon Constitution). 
135 State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220 (Wash. 2003). 
136 Id. at 220-21. 
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Police then tracked him to two remote locations.137 At the first 
location, police found the body of the missing daughter in a shallow 
grave, and at the second location, police found duct tape and plastic 
bags containing hair and blood from the victim.138 Police then arrested 
the defendant.139 The trial court found him guilty of first degree 
murder and sentenced him to prison time.140 On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the use of the GPS device violated the Washington 
Constitution.141 The appellate court held that the warrantless 
installation of a GPS device did not violate the Washington 
constitution.142  
Accordingly, Jackson appealed to the Washington Supreme 
Court.143 The court found that while they were affirming Jackson’s 
conviction, police should be required to obtain warrants prior to 
installing GPS devices pursuant to the state constitution.144  
 
5.  Biddle v. State (Delaware State, 2006)—GPS Case 
 
In Biddle, a civilian installed a GPS device in another civilian’s 
vehicle.145 The State argued that there is “an expectation of privacy in 
the undercarriage of one’s vehicle” and that the defendant violated this 
when she installed the GPS device.146 The court held that there is a 
reduced privacy expectation when traveling on public roads, “but the 
police do not have the unfettered right to tamper with a vehicle by 
surreptitiously attaching a tracking device without either the owner’s 
                                                 
137 Id. at 221. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 221-22. 
142 Id. at 222. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 224. 
145 Biddle v. State, No.  05-01-1052, 2006 WL 1148663, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 14, 2006). 
146 Id. 
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consent or without a warrant issued by the court.”147 The court held 
that “the basic principle that a person has a protected privacy interest 
in his/her automobile is still applicable.”148 Therefore, the court held 
that the defendant violated this legitimate privacy expectation.149 
 
C.  A Chronological Look at Circuit Court and State Court Cases 
Finding the Use of GPS Devices or Beepers is  NOT a Search 
 
In the cases that follow, the courts ruled that there was not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.150 
 
1.  United States v. Pretzinger (Ninth Circuit, 1976)—Beeper Case 
 
In Pretzinger, DEA agents attached a beeper to a plane to track 
the defendant’s movements.151 After doing so, the agents were able to 
arrest the defendant for drug related crimes.152 The defendant argued 
that his arrest was the product of an illegal search because the police 
attached a beeper to the plane.153 The court noted that the law in the 
Ninth Circuit is clear that when a device is attached to a vehicle 
moving on public roads—or airspace in this case—it is not a search 
because it does not infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy.154 
The court found that no warrant is required in a case like this unless 
Fourth Amendment rights could be violated.155 In Pretzinger, the 
Tenth Circuit noted that the DEA agents had established probable 
                                                 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at *2.  
149 Id.   
150 United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 
(9th Cir. 1976). 
151 Pretzinger, 542 F.2d at 519. 
152 Id. at 520.  
153 Id.   
154 Id.  
155 Id.   
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cause and had applied for a warrant, protecting the Fourth 
Amendment.156 
 
2.  United States v. McIver (Ninth Circuit, 1999)—GPS Case 
 
In McIver, the police placed a GPS device on the underside of the 
defendant’s vehicle.157 The court found that the warrantless installation 
of the GPS device did not violate the Fourth Amendment for many 
reasons.158 First, the defendant never did anything to manifest his 
intent to keep the underside of the vehicle private.159 Second, the 
defendant failed to prove that the warrantless installation of the GPS 
device deprived him of dominion and control of his vehicle.160 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held a search or seizure did not occur and 
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated.161 
 
3.  People v. Gant (New York, 2005)—GPS Case 
 
In Gant, the police placed a GPS device on an RV, leading to the 
defendant’s arrest.162 The defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress 
all evidence obtained as a result of the GPS device.163 The court stated 
                                                 
156 Id.   
157 United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1127. 
160 Id.  
161 Id.; See Osburn v. Nevada, 44 P.3d 523 (Nev. 2002), where the court held 
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of 
his car; therefore, there was no search or seizure. Id. at 526; See also People v. 
Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8 (N.Y. Co. Ct. May 6, 2004), where the court held 
that the police should have obtained a warrant before attaching the GPS device. Id at 
*8. However, the court found that the defendant did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his vehicle because it was used in connection with 
committing a crime and he did not own the vehicle. Id. at *9. Therefore, the court 
held that installing the GPS was allowed. Id.  
162 People v. Gant, 9 Misc.3d 611, 617 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2005). 
163 Id. 
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that without a valid expectation of privacy, there can be no search or 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.164 Therefore, the defendant had 
the burden of proving a valid expectation of privacy, which he failed 
to do.165 Accordingly, the court determined that the police were not 
required to obtain a warrant before installing the GPS device.166 In 
doing so, the court relied on Knotts, which stated that “a person 
traveling on a public roadway has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”167 The court, 
again relying on Knotts, noted that “‘one has a lesser expectation of 
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it 
seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal 
effects.’”168  
 
III.  SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION: UNITED STATES V. GARCIA 
 
United States v. Garcia is the first case where the Seventh Circuit 
squarely faced the issue of whether covert use of a GPS device is a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.169 In an opinion authored by 
Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit found that GPS use does not 
constitute a search; therefore, the Fourth Amendment is not 
violated.170  
 
 
                                                 
164 Id. at 618-19. 
165 Id. at 618. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 619. 
168 Id.; See also United States v. Moran, 349 F.Supp.2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(where the court held that because the defendant did not have a valid expectation of 
privacy while traveling on a public road, it was not a search or seizure and the Fourth 
Amendment was not implicated); State v. Scott, 2006 WL 2642001, at *4 (NJ Aug. 
8, 2006) ) (where the court held that that when the police had probable cause prior to 
attaching a GPS device, that was enough to avoid implicating the Fourth 
Amendment). 
169 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
170 Id.  
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A.  The Facts of Garcia 
 
In Garcia, the police suspected the defendant was involved in 
making methamphetamine.171 Therefore, they installed a GPS device 
on the vehicle he was using, without his knowledge, while the car was 
parked on a public street.172 The police did not obtain a search warrant 
or court order prior to doing so.173 After reviewing the information 
obtained from the GPS device, the police learned the locations where 
the vehicle had been driven.174 Then, the agents obtained a warrant to 
search those locations and found materials used to make 
methamphetamine.175 While the agents were searching the property, 
the defendant drove onto the property whereby the agents searched his 
car, finding other methamphetamine materials.176 Accordingly, the 
defendant was charged “with crimes related to methamphetamine 
cooking.”177 
 
B.  First Report and Recommendation 
 
In the first of two Report and Recommendations, the defendant 
attempted to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the GPS device, 
alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.178 The magistrate judge noted 
that the Seventh Circuit, among others, had yet to decide this issue.179 
After Knotts, the defendant knew that he would likely be unsuccessful 
in any GPS monitoring challenge because he was tracked on a public 
                                                 
171 United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155-C, 2006 WL 298704, at *1 (W.D. 
Wis. Feb. 3, 2006). 
172 Id.  
173 Id.  
174 Id.  
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Id. at *2. 
178 Id. at *1.  
179 Id.  
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street.180 Therefore, “Garcia limit[ed] his challenge to the question left 
open in Knotts: the reasonableness of the warrantless installation of a 
tracking device on his vehicle.”181 The court noted that this issue has 
been previously avoided by the Supreme Court.182  
The court then discussed the Knotts decision, specifically noting 
that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while 
traveling on public roads and that using a beeper is simply augmenting 
what the police could have done on their own without it.183 The district 
court then noted that three justices concurred in Knotts—Justices 
Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall—stating that “it would have been a 
much thornier case if the defendants had challenged the installation of 
the beeper.”184 The district court also noted that Karo held that the 
Fourth Amendment was violated when the device was used on private 
property, but that Karo was not directly on point because in Karo the 
defendants did not challenge the installation of the beeper.185 
The court then analyzed many federal and state court cases that 
dealt with beepers being used in surveillance, but noted that many of 
them were not as damaging to Garcia as the government wanted them 
to be.186 The court settled on the single issue it needed to decide: 
“under what circumstances, if any, does the Fourth Amendment forbid 
the government from installing a tracking device on a person’s private 
property?”187 The court then stated it seemed “reasonably clear that the 
government must at least have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
is engaged in criminal activity and that monitoring his motor vehicle 
will produce evidence useful to the investigation.”188  
                                                 
180 Id. at *2.  
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at *4.  
185 Id.   
186 Id. at *5. 
187 Id. at *7. 
188 Id.  
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Further, the court did not agree with the government’s idea that 
the government could install a GPS device “on nothing more than its 
say-so.”189 The court then narrowed the issues down.190 First, “[m]ust 
the government go a step further and establish probable cause to install 
a locational transmitter in a case like Garcia’s?”191 Second, 
“[r]egardless which level of proof must be established, may the 
government obtain the court’s post-hoc imprimatur in a case like 
Garcia’s?”192 
The court found that reasonable suspicion is enough, and that a 
post-hoc hearing is enough to protect the defendant’s rights.193 The 
court then noted that the GPS installation on Garcia’s car caused 
minimal government intrusion, and that the real intrusion is the 
monitoring of the car that follows.194 However, since the monitoring 
was not deemed an intrusion in Knotts, the court reasoned that the 
installation could not be a more significant intrusion than the 
monitoring.195 The court finally noted that the government had to 
prove that no violation had occurred, but failed to do so.196 Therefore, 
the magistrate judge recommended that suppression was appropriate 
unless the government could prove it had reasonable suspicion to 
install the GPS device.197 The magistrate judge recommended the 
following:  
 
Before the government may install a [GPS on a vehicle] . . . it 
must establish at least a reasonable suspicion that the car’s 
owner(s)/driver(s) are engaged in criminal activity, and that 
                                                 
189 Id.  
190 Id.  
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 Id. at *8. 
194 Id.  
195 Id. 
196 Id.  
197 Id.  
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knowledge of the car’s movement in public places will lead to the 
discovery of evidence relevant to the criminal investigation.198 
 
C.  Second Report and Recommendation 
 
In the First Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge 
stated that the police must have reasonable suspicion before installing 
the GPS device.199 Therefore, the issue before the court in the Second 
Report and Recommendation was whether the government could 
prove that it had reasonable suspicion to install the GPS device.200 
After analyzing the facts the agents had available to them before 
installing the GPS device, the court determined that the agents had 
more than a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in 
criminal activity.201 Therefore, the court denied Garcia’s motion to 
suppress.202 
However, the court went on to note that “[a]lthough this court has 
not imposed on the government a duty to establish probable cause to 
attach the GPS device, the Seventh Circuit might, so we should 
address the issue prophylactically. As a technical matter, this section of 
the report is dicta.”203 After a long discussion of the probable cause 
standard, the court found that if the government had to prove probable 
cause in this case, it would have no trouble.204 
 
D.  Order 
 
The defendant objected to the Second Report and 
Recommendation on the grounds that although the police may have 
                                                 
198 Id. at *1. 
199 Id. at *1. 
200 United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155, 2006 WL 1294578, at *1 (W.D. 
Wis. May 10, 2006). 
201 Id. at *5. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at *5-*6 
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had reasonable suspicion to suspect that the defendant was involved in 
criminal activity, they did not have reasonable suspicion that tracking 
the defendant’s vehicle would lead to the discovery of evidence.205 
Both were required according to the First Report and 
Recommendation.206 The judge did not agree with Garcia, finding that 
the agents had reasonable suspicion (and actually had probable cause 
as well) to support their decision to install a GPS tracking device.207  
 
E.  Appellate Court Case: February 2, 2007 
 
The issue on appeal was “whether evidence obtained as a result of 
a [GPS] . . . should have been suppressed as the fruit of an 
unconstitutional search.”208 The Seventh Circuit held that the GPS 
installation was not a search; therefore, the evidence should not be 
suppressed and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.209 
On appeal, the defendant argued that in addition to reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause, the police had to have a warrant before 
installing the GPS device.210 The government argued that a warrant 
was not needed because the police actions did not constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.211 The court noted that there is nothing 
in the Fourth Amendment requiring a warrant for a search to be 
reasonable.212 However, the Supreme Court “has created a 
presumption that a warrant is required, unless infeasible, for a search 
                                                 
205 United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-155-C, 2006 WL 1601716, *1 (W.D. 
Wis. May 31, 2006).  
206 Id. 
207 Id. at *2. 
208 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007). 
209 Id. at 994. 
210 Id. at 996. 
211 Id.  
212 Id.   
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to be reasonable.”213 The court went on to note that this presumption 
only matters when there has been an actual search or seizure.214  
The defendant claimed that when the police installed the GPS 
device, it was a seizure.215 The court disagreed, stating:  
 
[t]he device did not affect the car’s driving qualities, did not draw 
power from the car’s engine or battery, did not take up room that 
might otherwise have been occupied by passengers or packages, 
did not even alter the car’s appearance, and in short did not 
“seize” the car in any intelligible sense of the word.216 
 
The court next considered if monitoring the GPS device was a search, 
but following Knotts, determined it was not.217 However, the court 
noted that Knotts did not answer the question of “whether installing 
the device in the vehicle converted the subsequent tracking into a 
search.”218 The Seventh Circuit noted a circuit split over this exact 
issue and that Garcia was a case of first impression in the Seventh 
Circuit.219 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that installation does 
not constitute a search and the First, Sixth, and Tenth circuits have 
held the opposite.220  
The court noted the issue here is the difference between the police 
following the defendant in their own cars and the police using GPS 
devices to do it for them.221 Judge Posner called this a difference 
between the new technology and the old.222 Judge Posner concluded 
                                                 
213 Id.   
214 Id.  
215 Id.  
216 Id.  
217 Id.  
218 Id. at 996-97. 
219 Id. at 997. 
220 Id.   
221 Id.   
222 Id.  
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that GPS tracking is not a Fourth Amendment violation because it is 
just new technology which makes following defendants easier.223  
However, Judge Posner wrote that Katz must be considered 
because in Katz, the Supreme Court noted “that the meaning of a 
Fourth Amendment search must change to keep pace with the march 
of science.”224 Additionally, the court noted that in Kyllo, “the use of a 
thermal imager to reveal details of the interior of a home that could not 
otherwise be discovered without a physical entry” was a search.225 
However, the court went on to distinguish Kyllo because in Kyllo the 
technology completed a search that the police could not otherwise 
have done without the imager.226 Judge Posner called the imager a 
“substitute for a form of a search,” but in Garcia the GPS device was a 
substitute for an activity, an activity already determined not to be a 
search.227 Accordingly, the court noted that when the officers installed 
the GPS device, it was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.228 
Further, Judge Posner noted that GPS could allow for wholesale 
surveillance.229 The police could install GPS devices to thousands of 
cars at random,230 or laws could be passed requiring all cars to have 
GPS so that the police can easily monitor them.231 Importantly, Judge 
Posner noted that at this time he cannot say that those situations would 
not implicate the Fourth Amendment.232 However, he noted that there 
is no reason to think that the police should not get more efficient as 
                                                 
223 Id.   
224 Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
225 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 
(2001)). 
226 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 994. 
229 Id. at 998. 
230 Id.  
231 Id.  
232 Id. 
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time goes on.233 He stated that “there is a tradeoff between security 
and privacy, and often it favors security.”234 Judge Posner noted: 
 
Technological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an 
extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been 
prohibitively expensive. Whether and what kind of restrictions 
should, in the name of the Constitution, be placed on such 
surveillance when used in routine criminal enforcement are 
momentous issues that fortunately we need not try to resolve.235  
 
Therefore, Judge Posner was aware of the danger his ruling could 
create, but inexplicably avoided dealing with it, stating that there was 
no evidence of mass surveillance at this time.236 Rather, he said that in 
Garcia, the police had “abundant grounds for suspecting the 
defendant.”237 But he also noted, “[s]hould government someday 
decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular 
movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth 
Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a 
search.”238  
 
IV.  GARCIA WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
 
The Seventh Circuit decided Garcia incorrectly. The Seventh 
Circuit should have held a warrant is required prior to the police 
installing a GPS device. Four separate arguments for why Garcia 
should have come out differently are detailed below.   
 
 
 
                                                 
233 Id.  
234 Id.  
235 Id. 
236 Id.  
237 Id.  
238 Id.  
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A.  The Seventh Circuit Made Many Errors in Its Reasoning 
 
1.  Beeper Cases Should Not Be Controlling in Deciding GPS Cases 
 
A dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas from United States v. 
White stated that “[w]hat the ancients knew as ‘eavesdropping,’ we 
now call ‘electronic surveillance’; but to equate the two is to treat 
man's first gunpowder on the same level as the nuclear bomb.”239 So 
too is comparing beepers and GPS devices. GPS technology is so new 
and so different than anything that the drafters of the Fourth 
Amendment and the authors of previous beeper cases could have 
imagined. Therefore, the beeper line of cases should not be controlling 
in deciding GPS cases. 
The level of intrusiveness, invasiveness, and sophistication of 
GPS devices as compared to beepers mandates that beeper cases 
cannot be controlling in deciding GPS cases. There are many 
differences between GPS devices and beepers as discussed above in 
the Background section. To recap, GPS devices, as noted in State v. 
Jackson, are particularly invasive because they provide constant 
uninterrupted surveillance.240 Beepers do not and cannot provide a 
detailed report of the vehicle’s movements like GPS devices can. GPS 
devices can track and record every single movement that a defendant 
makes for days, weeks, and months on end. Beeper devices are not 
that reliable and they can lose their signal. GPS devices do not lose 
their signal. 
Perhaps most important, GPS devices can be installed and then 
left alone. Someone can then go back and download the data from the 
GPS days, weeks, or months later. Beepers must be followed in real 
time by an actual person as the search is occurring.241 Beepers do not 
locate exactly where an object is, but rather emit a signal when the 
                                                 
239 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971). 
240 State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251 (Wash. 2003) (where the court 
discussed the possible dangers of not requiring warrants before attaching GPS 
devices). 
241 Id.  
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beeper is nearby.242 Therefore, the police must stay with the beeper 
during a live search to derive the benefit from it.243 In short, following 
a beeper signal requires an active search, whereas a GPS is a passive 
search.  
Because beepers and GPS are so different, courts are wrong to 
rely on beeper cases when deciding GPS cases. When the Supreme 
Court was deciding the various beeper cases discussed above,244 GPS 
technology was not yet available.245 There is no way the justices could 
have contemplated the “all-encompassing surveillance that is possible 
today” by using GPS.246 Their decisions were based on beeper 
technology. To compare the two is to compare apples and oranges, gun 
powder and the atomic bomb.  
Back when the beeper cases jurisprudence was being formulated, 
the resources required to track a suspect 24/7 proved to be a necessary 
check on the police.247 Therefore, the police would only follow a 
suspect 24/7 when they were pretty sure that it would produce 
evidence.248 Now, however, police can install a GPS device even 
without strong evidence and without having to prove reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause and without having to obtain a warrant.249  
Because GPS is a technology that was not at all contemplated 
when beeper cases were being decided, the reasoning from those cases 
is irrelevant to GPS cases and should not apply. Following this 
argument then, the “no reasonable expectation of privacy while 
travelling on public roads” argument from Knotts should not be 
relevant to GPS cases.    
                                                 
242 Hutchins, supra note 31, at 435. 
243 Id. 
244 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276 (1983); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
245 Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Seventh Circuit Holds That GPS 
Tracking is Not a Search, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2230, 2233 (2007).  
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 2234. 
33
Stephens: Caution! Government Intrusion May Be Closer Than It Appears: The
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 650
2.  Garcia: Missed Opportunity to Keep Science in Check 
 
Technology in this country is rapidly advancing, as evidenced by 
the rise of GPS technology. When the Fourth Amendment was written, 
there was no way for the drafters to even contemplate GPS technology. 
Therefore, courts today have to reconcile Fourth Amendment 
protections in a time of rapidly advancing technology. First, in 1963, 
in a concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, Chief Justice Warren 
expressed concern over advances in science posing a threat to the 
privacy of individuals and a threat to an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.250 Chief Justice Warren stated: 
 
Fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication 
constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; that 
indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises 
grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments; and that these considerations impose a heavier 
responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of 
procedures in the federal court system.251 
 
GPS technology constitutes a “fantastic” advancement in technology 
that Chief Justice Warren warned against back in 1963.252  
Additionally, in United States v. Knotts, Justice Rehnquist, 
“recognizing that constitutional protections may be warranted if 
tracking surveillance revealed more than the limited quantity of 
information disclosed by a beeper,”253 stated that if law enforcement 
begins using “dragnet type law enforcement practices” then perhaps it 
will be time to consider whether a constitutional issue arises.254 
Therefore, Justice Rehnquist was aware that the issue of warrantless 
installation of beepers could pose a constitutional problem. He warned 
                                                 
250 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963). 
251 Id.  
252 Id. 
253 Hutchins, supra note 31, at 440. 
254 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). 
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future courts that if the beeper technology expands beyond what it was 
in 1983, then courts will need to take a second look to determine if 
constitutional issues arise. Today, it is time for courts to heed Justice 
Rehnquist’s warning and take this second look.  
Further, in Dow Chemical Company v. United States, the 
Environmental Protection Agency took aerial photographs of a 
plant.255 The Supreme Court found it was not a search for many 
reasons including that the information gained from the pictures was 
nothing more than augmentation of naked-eye view.256 However, the 
Court noted, “[i]t may well be . . . that surveillance of private property 
by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment . . . such as 
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a 
warrant.”257  
Furthermore, Judge Posner spent about a quarter of the Garcia 
decision discussing how there is a danger of “dragnet type law 
enforcement practices” in the form of mass surveillance lurking in the 
Garcia case. He discussed the tradeoff between privacy and security. 
He talked about how science is advancing and the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment needs to change to keep current with science. He 
even referenced the above quote from Chief Justice Warren about the 
fantastic advances in science.258 But then, after noting all the possible 
problems with police use of GPS devices, Judge Posner stated that for 
now the problems are not big enough to cause concern.259  
Judge Posner could have, and should have, offered some guidance 
on how the police should lawfully use GPS devices and he could and 
should have guided future courts on how to rule on GPS use without 
infringing on the Fourth Amendment. Judge Posner could have and 
should have taken the opportunity to state that police must obtain a 
warrant before the police can lawfully install the device. This ruling 
would have kept in line with the balance between privacy and security 
                                                 
255 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
256 Id. at 238. 
257 Id. (emphasis added). 
258 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
259 Id.  
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that he spoke of in his opinion. Why did Judge Posner avoid the 
opportunity to address these issues? Garcia was a case of first 
impression after all.260 It would have been a great chance for the 
Seventh Circuit to set out clear standards that would serve to protect 
the Fourth Amendment.  
The invention of GPS and the advent of the police using it without 
having to show reasonable suspicion or probable cause or without 
having to obtain a warrant is exactly the type of “dragnet type law 
enforcement practices” that Justice Rehnquist warned about. 
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit and other courts should have heeded 
Chief Justice Warren’s warning and found that installing GPS devices 
constitutes a search; therefore, a warrant is required prior to 
installation.  
 
3.  The Seventh Circuit’s Discussion of the Possibility of 24/7 Police 
Surveillance is Impractical 
 
Judge Posner stated that the police could have accomplished the 
search in Garcia without GPS, but that GPS made the search easier. 
However, on closer inspection, it is pretty clear that that the police 
could not have accomplished the 24/7 tracking of the defendant if they 
had to do it with manpower alone. It is nearly impossible to imagine a 
police force that could handle such a task. It is very unlikely that the 
police could follow any defendant long enough to maintain a perfect 
record of all of movements.261  
Imagine a police force attempting to obtain the same results by 
following a person that they could obtain with a GPS. The discussion 
below will prove this to be impossible. If the police had five suspects 
who they wanted to follow for a period of two months, this would take 
at the very least forty officers dedicated full time to tracking these 
suspects and maintaining the perfect record. There are three eight-hour 
shifts a day, seven days a week, for a total of twenty-one shifts a week. 
Imagine that each officer works four shifts a week with a partner. 
                                                 
260 Id.  
261 Id. 
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Therefore, it would take eight officers tracking a suspect full-time to 
track just one suspect. If there are five suspects, that would require 
forty officers tracking the suspects full-time.  
Therefore, it is easy to see that police officers likely cannot 
perform such searches without the use of a GPS device. What police 
force has forty police officers—eight per suspect—to spare? 
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s argument that the police could have 
performed the search without the GPS, but the GPS made it easier, is 
impractical, and that reasoning should have no bearing on the decision. 
The Seventh Circuit should have found, like in Kyllo, that when the 
officers cannot perform the search without the device, they should not 
be able to do it. 
 
B.  Requiring a Warrant Imposes a Rather Low Burden on Police, but 
Provides a High Benefit to Individuals 
 
In today’s rapidly advancing electronic day and age, obtaining a 
warrant is not hard to do. A police officer could ask a judge for a quick 
meeting, could call him or her on the phone, or can even send the 
judge an email requesting a warrant. Generally speaking, the decision 
to install a GPS device to a suspect’s car is likely made in a police 
station. And presumably, the decision is made after looking at the 
evidence in a case and deciding that it would be worthwhile to follow 
a particular subject. Also, presumably, the police officer has to request 
a GPS device from somewhere. Is it really possible that police officers 
have handfuls of GPS devices just laying around? Doubtful.  
Considering that at least part of this process is presumably done in 
the police station, it would not be that difficult to require the police 
officer to send a quick email to the judge to get a warrant before 
installing the GPS device. It is hard to imagine a circumstance that 
would arise where in the middle of an emergency a police officer 
would absolutely need to install a GPS device, and if he did it is likely 
this situation would fall under the exigent circumstances exception to 
requiring a warrant anyway. Therefore, it seems like a very small 
37
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burden to impose on the police, for a very high payoff for 
individuals—the utmost protection of the Fourth Amendment.262 
 
C.  Previous Cases Provide Valuable Insight that the Seventh Circuit 
Should Have Adopted 
 
Previous cases that have addressed electronic surveillance could 
have provided the Seventh Circuit with valuable insight that would 
have led the court to make the proper ruling in Garcia. The First 
Circuit in Moore, as previously discussed above, stated that when a 
beeper is attached to a car, the beeper “transforms the vehicle . . . into 
a messenger” to aid the police.263 The court noted that people 
“properly can expect not to be carrying around an uninvited device 
that continuously signals his presence.”264 This court clearly noted that 
even though people might not have an expectation of privacy on 
public roads, they do have certain privacy expectations deserving of 
protection. 
“In the case of GPS-enabled tracking, it is this aggregation of 
substantial amounts of personal data that makes the limitless use of the 
technology constitutionally troublesome.”265 Therefore, it is quite 
likely that back when Knotts was decided in 1983, the Supreme Court 
did not envision “the unfettered use of GPS-enabled tracking” and the 
sophistication of GPS technology.266 
Further, the Sixth Circuit in Bailey expressed its opinion that no 
matter how small the intrusion, it can still have an effect on Fourth 
Amendment concerns when the intrusion invades an expectation of 
                                                 
262 See Hutchins, supra note 31, at 463; United States v. Berry, 300 F.Supp.2d 
366 (D. Md. 2004); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003). 
263 United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977). 
264 Id.   
265 Hutchins, supra note 31, at 453.  
266 Id. at 453-54. 
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privacy.267 The court clearly expressed its idea that the Fourth 
Amendment can be violated even when the violation is de minimus.268 
In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court in Biddle noted that “the 
police do not have the unfettered right to tamper with a vehicle by 
surreptitiously attaching a tracking device without either the owner’s 
consent or without a warrant issued by a court.”269 The court held that 
“the basic principle that a person has a protected privacy interest in 
his/her automobile is still applicable.”270  
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit would not have been the only court 
to find that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy that their 
possessions will not be meaningfully interfered with. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that one’s possessions will not be tampered 
with on a public road. The Seventh Circuit should have adopted the 
holdings or reasoning of these courts when they decided Garcia.  
 
D.  Installation of a GPS is A Seizure; Therefore, There are Fourth 
Amendment Concerns  
 
A concurring opinion from the Ninth Circuit in McIver by Judge 
Kleinfeld sets out an interesting way of addressing the GPS problem—
a way that the Garcia court and all courts should follow. He stated that 
installing tracking devices on vehicles should be subject to Fourth 
Amendment concerns.271 He disagreed with the majority in McIver 
that doing so was not a seizure.272 He noted that under the Fourth 
Amendment, a seizure occurs when there is “some meaningful 
interference with an individual’s possessory interests.”273 He argued 
that the meaningful interference in McIver was not the liberty to drive 
                                                 
267 United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 940 (6th Cir. 1980). 
268 Id. 
269 Biddle v. State, No. 05-01-1052, 2006 WL 1148663, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 14, 2006). 
270 Id. at *2. 
271 United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1133 (9th Cir. 1999). 
272 Id.   
273 Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984)).  
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on a public street without being watched, but rather the “possessory 
interest of the owner of a vehicle in excluding individuals from 
performing mechanical work on his vehicle or altering it without his 
consent.”274 
Further, Judge Kleinfeld noted that the Supreme Court has 
extended Fourth Amendment analysis recently.275 He stated that it was 
extended to include situations “to protect privacy from government 
intrusion even where the individuals intruded upon lack any property 
interest in the area where the intrusion was made.”276 The Supreme 
Court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects property as well as 
privacy.”277 Therefore, he argued that even if the defendant in McIver 
did not have a privacy interest in the car, “he had a right guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment to be free of a ‘seizure’ of his car unless a 
search warrant issued upon probable cause” existed in the case.278  
The concurrence stated that one of the main property rights “is the 
right to exclude others.”279 Therefore, car owners’ possessory rights 
are interfered with when the police install a device to their car even if 
there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.280  
Judge Posner stated that the use of GPS did not constitute a 
seizure.281 He stated that the GPS device “in short did not ‘seize’ the 
car in any intelligible sense of the word.”282 While it is true that the 
GPS device did not interfere with the functioning of the car and did 
not take up space, that is not the correct way to determine if the car 
was seized however. It was a seizure in the Garcia case for the reasons 
Judge Kleinfeld stated above and because of the reasons previously 
discussed in Moore, Bailey, and Biddle. 
                                                 
274 McIver, 186 F.3d at 1133. 
275 Id.  
276 Id.  
277 Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)). 
278 McIver, 186 F.3d at 1133-34. 
279 Id. at 1134 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)). 
280 McIver, 186 F.3d at 1134. 
281 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007). 
282 Id.  
40
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 657
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The focus of this comment is not to question whether police 
officers should use GPS technology, but rather to argue that police 
should be required, before using GPS technology, to successfully pass 
through the gate keeping functions set out to protect individuals’ 
Fourth Amendment rights, namely requiring a warrant prior to 
commencing a search. Currently, courts are deciding GPS cases based 
off of beeper jurisprudence. However, when courts were deciding 
beeper cases, GPS technology had yet to even be contemplated. 
Therefore, beeper cases should not be used to analyze GPS cases. 
Instead, GPS cases should be analyzed under an entire new line of 
reasoning based on the idea that people do have a reasonable 
expectation that their every movement is not being 100% accurately 
tracked by the police. Therefore, the installation of GPS devices 
should be considered a search. Accordingly, police officers should be 
required to obtain a warrant prior to installing a GPS device.  
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